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| **Selected Scholarship** | **Concept** | **Measurement orientation** | **More Specific**  **Broader** |
| García-Montiel et al. (2017) | “more rigorous,” “higher level,” “higher quality,” and thus “Greater complexity/ Effectiveness/ Cost” vs. “More Simplicity/Lower Cost” | Number of indicators. Descriptions of consistency, coherency, and completeness. |
| Moore et al. (2012) | Management practices changed | Survey of self-reported number and type of management practices implemented |
| McDermott et al. (2010; 2008) | “comprehensiveness and prescriptiveness” | Number of key issues with most prescriptive language |
| Overdevest and Zeitlin (2012) | “far apart” or “closer” on select “Program Characteristics” | Binary table of select issues and descriptive examples |
| Overdevest (2005, 2010) | “comparative quality”— “weaker” standards are “revised upwards” to be “equivalent” to “higher and more prescriptive standards” | Descriptive theory, examples, and review of previous comparisons |
| Fransen (2011), Fransen & Conzellman (2015) | “stringency” as “comprehensive in scope, specific in content, and prescriptive in terms of requirements” | Descriptions based on “leading policy analysts per issue area” |
| Hansen et al. (2006) | Select “general features” and “six aspects” of management | Descriptive table of select issues |
| Auld (2014) | “Policy scope and regulatory domain” “policy changes,” “character of the rules developed” | Description of the set of problems addressed and how |
| Cashore et al. (2004) | “stringency” | Descriptive theory and examples |
| Smith & Fischlein (2010) | “stringency” of “weightings across multiple, and often conflicting, attributes,” also “excellence in content” | Descriptive theory and examples |
| Porter (2014) | “hard law” or “soft law” | Descriptive examples |
| Gulbrandsen (2004) | “variations in the strength of standards”—“more stringent and less discretionary,” “more rigorous and wide-ranging” vs. “weak or lax” “and allow far wider flexibility” Some “regulations have become more flexible” while others are “changing upward” | Descriptive examples |
| Eberlein et al. (2014) | “differentiation among rule systems” along “dimensions of regulatory governance,” e.g. “more or less stringent requirements” or “regulatory capacity” | Descriptive typology and examples |
| Hassel (2008) | “high and low quality regulation”, “higher standards” vs. “lower standards” | Descriptive theory and examples |
| Bartley (2003) | “more credible claims” vs. “lax standards” | Descriptive theory and examples |
| Abbott & Snidal (2008) | “substance and form of regulatory outcomes”—  “stringent” “higher standards” vs. “less stringent” “business-friendly” “weaker standards” | Descriptive theory |
| Bernstein & Cashore (2007) | Pressure to “raise” or “lower” requirements “explains convergence/ divergence” | Descriptive theory |
| Kollman & Prakash (2011), Potoski & Prakash (2004), Prakash & Potoski 2006) | “lax” or “processes-based” vs. “more stringent” “outcome-based” or “product-based” “types of regulations” | ISO14001 classified as process-based, stringency assessed only for public regulations |
| Prakash & Potoski (2007) | “stringent” vs. “lenient” standards | Proportional costs, social externalities, and branding benefits |
| Formal models of “stringency” or “quality” | “sustainability quality level” (Poret 2016), “more ambitious” (Fischer et al., 2017), “stricter rules” (Schmitz et al., 2017), “stringency” (Fischer and Lyon 2014; Hayes and Martin, 2017) | Proportional costs & benefits to programs & firms |
| Formal models of issue scope | “issue-width” in an “issue space” (Hayes and Martin 2015) | Proportional costs and benefits to programs and funders |

Table 1: Concepts and measurement of variation in the content of private regulations